Physician-assisted Suicide: Some Reasons for Rejecting Lord Falconer’s Bill
by Professor John Keown

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He has written widely on the law and ethics of medicine. His six books include Euthanasia Examined (Cambridge University Press, 1995); Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Debating Euthanasia (with Emily Jackson, Hart Publishing, 2012) and The Law and Ethics of Medicine (Oxford University Press, 2012).

His work has been cited by the US Supreme Court, the Law Lords, the Court of Appeal, and the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics. He testified before the Australian Senate committee considering the Northern Territory euthanasia law, and testified as a witness for the Attorney-General of Canada in Carter v Canada (Attorney-General), a case concerning a challenge to Canada’s law against voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.


1. The case for legalising voluntary, active euthanasia (VAE) and/or physician-assisted suicide (PAS) has been repeatedly and exhaustively considered, and overwhelmingly rejected, by legislatures, courts and expert committees worldwide, not least by the House of Lords.

2. The case has also long been rejected by the medical profession. The World Medical Association reaffirmed its opposition in 2013. In 2006 a survey by the Royal College of Physicians of its members found that over 70% (and 95% of those in palliative medicine) agreed that: ‘[W]ith improvements in palliative care, good clinical care can be provided within existing legislation and...patients can die with dignity. A change in legislation is not needed.’

3. A first major reason for maintaining the historic legal and medical prohibition on intentionally killing patients, and intentionally helping them to kill themselves, is the fundamental equality-in-dignity of all patients. As the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics put it in 1994: ‘That prohibition is the cornerstone of law and of social relationships. It protects each one of us impartially, embodying the belief that all are equal.’

4. VAE and PAS are, by contrast, grounded in the belief that some patients have lives which are no longer ‘worth living’ and that they would be ‘better off dead’.

5. Once the law abandons its historic, bright-line prohibition on intentionally ending the lives of patients, or on intentionally helping them to end their own lives, it invites arbitrary and discriminatory judgments about which patients would be ‘better off dead’.


Lord Falconer’s Assisted Dying Bill would enable ‘competent adults who are terminally ill to be provided at their request with specified assistance to end their own life’. Its first reading took place on 5 June and its second reading, the general debate on the Bill, is scheduled for 18 July.

http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2014-15/assisteddying.html
6. Lord Falconer’s euphemistically-named ‘Assisted Dying’ Bill is based on such judgments. It is also a ‘foot in the door’.

7. The Bill would allow PAS for the ‘terminally ill’. But:

(i) The two main arguments typically used to justify PAS equally justify VAE. The first is respect for patient autonomy. The second is that death would benefit the patient by ending suffering (though the Bill does not even require suffering, merely that the patient be ‘terminally ill’). If those arguments justify lethal prescriptions, they equally justify lethal injections (especially if the patient is physically unable to commit suicide).

(ii) Those arguments equally justify ending the lives of those who are not ‘terminally ill’, and who face suffering for many years, not merely six months.

8. The Dutch, the pioneers of VAE and PAS since 1984, agree with the leading academic advocates of so-called ‘assisted dying’ that such limitations are indefensible. Dutch law allows both VAE and PAS, and whether the patient is ‘terminally ill’ or not. Further, there is now much support in the Netherlands (including from the former Health Minister, an architect of their law) for granting requests by the elderly who are ‘tired of life’. And why not?

The Falconer Bill is, clearly, a first step onto the same, precipitous slope.

9. Moreover, if relief of suffering justifies ending the lives of patients who request death, why deny this benefit to suffering patients merely because they are incapable of requesting it? Again, the Dutch, together with their leading academic defenders, recognise that compassion cannot logically be confined to the competent. This logical argument is unanswerable.

In 1984 the Dutch courts declared VAE lawful because of the doctor’s duty to relieve suffering. In 1996 they ruled that this duty equally justified lethal injections for disabled newborns.

The Falconer Bill would, again, be but a first step down the same path.

10. The case for VAE/PAS does not, then, rest mainly on ‘respect for patient autonomy’. Under proposals like those in the Bill, the autonomous requests of only some patients would qualify. And they would qualify because of the judgment by others that they would indeed be ‘better off dead’. Any such judgment is fundamentally arbitrary and threatens, in particular, the most vulnerable members of the community.

11. No wonder disability groups are at the forefront of opposition to legalisation. They see more clearly than many: first, that it would signal social acceptance of the notion that some people would be ‘better off dead’, and, second, that the disabled would be prime candidates for this discriminatory designation.

12. In any event, how autonomous would requests for PAS actually be? In 2006, ‘deeply worried’ by Lord Joffe’s Bill to decriminalise PAS, the Royal College of Psychiatrists observed that studies of the terminally ill showed that depression is strongly associated with a desire for a hastened death and that, once depression is effectively treated, 98-99% change their mind about wanting to die.

It also cautioned that many doctors do not recognise depression or know how to assess for its presence in the terminally ill and that, even when they do recognise it, often think that ‘understandable depression’ is not real depression or cannot be treated.

13. The Falconer Bill would allow two registered medical practitioners to approve a request for PAS even if neither had any particular expertise in assessing capacity; in diagnosing or treating mental illness; in diagnosing ‘terminal illness’; or in palliative medicine. Neither need be the patient’s regular doctor. There is nothing to prevent a patient (or the patient’s relatives) ‘shopping around’ to find two compliant doctors.

The two doctors would be required to examine the patient and his or her records, certify that the patient is ‘terminally ill’, has the capacity to decide to commit suicide and has a ‘clear and settled intention’ to end his or her life, which has been formed ‘voluntarily’ and ‘on an informed basis and without coercion or duress’. A single examination by each doctor would presumably suffice. And how, for example, are the doctors to know whether the request is truly voluntary and is not the result of pressure from others, or of being made to feel a burden?

The Bill places enormous reliance on certification by two doctors. Leaving aside the ethics of abortion, a similar scheme of regulation under the Abortion Act 1967 has proved obviously ineffectual.

14. All this brings us to a second major reason why proposals to relax the law have (with few exceptions) been globally rejected: concerns about effective enforcement and control, not least to ensure that the lives of those who do not want to die - particularly those who are vulnerable to pressure – or whose suffering could be alleviated by palliative care, are protected.

15. These concerns have been amplified by the experience in the Netherlands, where several comprehensive, government-sponsored, surveys since 1990 have disclosed widespread breach of the legal guidelines, and with virtual impunity.

Those surveys have shown that, since legalisation in 1984, not only have doctors in thousands of cases breached the requirement to report, but they have also ended the lives of thousands of patients without the required request.
Small wonder the Dutch euthanasia regime has now been
criticised twice by the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, in 2001 and in 2009. 14

The experience in Belgium, which adopted the Dutch model
in 2002, exhibits these same two failures, with only around
half of cases reported, 15 and a high incidence of euthanasia
without request. 16

And, even if all cases were reported, this would hardly
demonstrate effective control. How many doctors are
likely to report that they have breached the guidelines?
Any scheme of regulating VAE/PAS which is reliant on
self-reporting (like those in the Netherlands, Belgium
and Oregon) is intrinsically ineffective.

Comprehensive surveys like those in the Netherlands
have yet to be carried out in any of the handful of US states
which have legalised PAS, most notably Oregon. But the
monitoring procedures in Oregon are even laxer than the
essentially ‘rubber stamp’ review procedure in the
Netherlands and Belgium. As an analysis by Professor
Alexander Capron, the leading US health lawyer,
concluded, Oregon’s safeguards are ‘largely illusory’. 17

Further, the annual statistical reports of the Oregon
Health Authority are far from reassuring: its report in 2014
discloses that, since the law came into effect in 1997,
the two most common reasons for accessing PAS have
been ‘losing autonomy’ and being ‘less able to engage
in activities making life enjoyable’; that for 40% a reason
has been feeling a burden on others; and that only 6% of
patients have been referred for psychiatric evaluation. 18

17. A recent, thorough review of the data from the Netherlands,
Belgium and Oregon by three judges of the Irish Divisional
Court led them to agree with the Supreme Courts of Canada,
the US, the Law Lords, and the European Court of Human
Rights, 19 that a blanket ban on PAS is entirely justified.

The Divisional Court noted that one study in Oregon showed
that of eighteen patients who obtained PAS, three had been
suffering from depression which had not been diagnosed or
been the subject of independent psychiatric evaluation. 20

The Court also noted a high incidence of euthanasia without
request in the Netherlands and Belgium. It observed that in
2005, ‘660 patients in the Netherlands (some 0.4% of all
deaths)’ were euthanised without an explicit request, 21 and
that ‘1.9% of all deaths which took place in the entirety of
Flanders between June and November 2007 were without
explicit request’. 22 The Court concluded that the fact that
such a ‘strikingly high level of legally assisted deaths
without explicit request’ occurred in the Netherlands and
Belgium ‘without any obvious official or popular concern’
spoke for itself as to the risks of legalisation. 23
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[Links abbreviated by CNK]


2. The WMA’s ‘Resolution on Euthanasia’ states that physician-assisted suicide, like euthanasia, ‘is unethical and must be condemned by the medical profession’. http://bit.ly/1mdzmQw

3. ‘RCP cannot support legal change on assisted dying – survey results’ http://bit.ly/1q04xt


6. Clause 2(1)(b). The definition of ‘terminal illness’ in Clause 2 is far from clear. Would it include cases where treatment which could extend life for more than six months is refused?

7. ‘Dutch Minister favours suicide pill’ http://cnn.it/1n75tg7

8. See John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2002) pp 119-20. In 2005 the Dutch Association for Paediatrics adopted the notorious ‘Groningen Protocol’ for infanticide. See John Griffiths et al, Euthanasia and Law in Europe (Hart, 2008) pp 231-33. Griffiths (a leading defender of Dutch euthanasia) observes (ibid, at p 252): ‘The applicable norms in the Netherlands have assuredly changed in the direction of open acceptance of the legitimacy of termination of the life of severely defective newborn babies...[T]he influence on these changes of the way euthanasia had earlier been legalised and regulated is obvious. In this sense, one might speak of a normative slippery slope.’


10. Clause 3(1)(b)(i) and (ii). Clause 3(7) provides that the second doctor is ‘suitably qualified’ if that doctor holds ‘such qualification or has such experience in respect of the diagnosis and management of terminal illness’ as the Secretary of State ‘may’ determine.

11. Clause 3(3)


15. Evidence tendered in 2011 by Belgian experts for the plaintiffs in the Carter case in Canada, in which the plaintiffs claimed a right to VAE, disclosed a reporting rate of only 52.8%. See Carter v Canada (Attorney-General) [2012] BCSQ 886 at paras 560 and 564.

16. 1.8% of all deaths in Flanders. Ibid at para 567. And see text at notes 21 and 22 infra. See generally Etienne Montero, Rendez-vous avec la mort: Dix ans d’euthanasie légal en Belgique (Anthemis, 2013).


18. Oregon Public Health Division, 2013 DWDA [‘Death with Dignity Act’] Report, Table 1: http://1.usa.gov/1g23d8G. On the Oregon law generally see Gorsuch, n 12 supra chapter 7.2.

19. In, respectively: Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney-General) [1993] 3 SCR 519; Washington v. Glucksberg 521 US 702 (1997) and Vacco v Quill 521 US 793 (1997); R(Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2001] UKHL 61; Pretty v United Kingdom 35 EHRR 1 (2002). Similarly, in R (on the application of Nicklinson and another)(Appellants) v Ministry of Justice (Respondent), R (on the application of AM) (AP) (Respondent) v The Director of Public Prosecutions (Appellant), R (on the application of AM) (AP) (Respondent) v The Director of Public Prosecutions (Appellant) [2014] UKSC 38 the UK Supreme Court recently declined to declare that the blanket ban on assisting suicide violates the European Convention on Human Rights.


21. Ibid at para 96 (original italics).

22. Ibid at para 99 (original italics).

23. Ibid at para 104.


25. Clause 8

26. Clause 9